Not long ago I had the privilege of meeting someone who is truly involved in Korean affairs, and he told me a story. In 1994, weeks before ex-President Jimmy Carter was sent to diffuse the North Korean nuclear crisis, my friend spoke with the North Korean administration. They explained to him exactly what they planned to tell Carter in the coming weeks -- the so-called "Agreed Framework," which would ultimately be credited to Carter as a negotiating masterpiece.
The lesson? North Korea is not crazy; they only want you to think they are. What Jimmy Carter "negotiated" in 1994 was actually planned out far in advance by North Korea, based on their calculations of what they could get for their "crisis." This is typical of North Korea's long history of brinkmanship. The crazier they appear, the more credible their threat, the more benefits they receive -- or so goes the logic.
Today's crisis, while young, is already bearing lessons as well. By deciding to pursue a diplomatic solution for North Korea, the Bush administration has demonstrated clear and mature foreign policy. But tonight, as Bush gives his State of the Union Address, we should also consider what lessons Korea has born thus far.
Here are three:
1) International security is not black and white. While perhaps politically effective, painting situations in such broad strokes as an "Axis of Evil" rarely is appropriate. When Bush did so after the Sept. 11 attacks, he managed to rally an emotional American public behind the notion that solving our problems could be done by quashing "evil-doers." He also, unfortunately, greatly confused the reality of the situation.
Consider that when South Korean President Kim Dae Jung first met Bush in March 2001, Bush flatly rejected Kim's "Sunshine Policy" of engagement with the North.
Then and after, Bush made it expressly clear that Washington had no intention of considering North Korea a negotiable situation, but rather a rogue state to be contained militarily. President Kim, a Nobel Peace Prize winner, returned home worried while North Korea braced for war.
Now that Bush finds himself seeking a negotiated peace with North Korea, it is striking how similar his methods have reverted to his predecessor's. Two years into office, like Clinton in the 1994 crisis, Bush has been forced to understand the logical nature and nuances of North Korean brinkmanship. Military pressure, as it turns out, doesn't make sense after all. Now as then, engagement emerges as the only sane policy for North Korea.
2) War is bad. There are numerous reasons that the only sane policy on North Korea is engagement; over 20 million of them live in Seoul, Korea, and greater Tokyo, Japan -- not to mention the more than 80,000 American civilian and military personnel in South Korea.
If North Korea has weapons grade plutonium, which is long consistent with CIA intelligence, imagine the consequences of nuclear bombs being dropped on those cities. This is the reality of war, and the military "option" against North Korea. As a democracy, we must remember that the blood of such a holocaust would trail back to our hands.
Bush's consideration of human cost and his subsequent balk at military action is a sobering reminder of what war is about. The casualties would simply be too high. It is worth noting, however, that applying this consideration to other cases begs rather controversial questions. Perhaps first: Are Arabs more expendable than East Asians?
3) Cooperative diplomacy is essential. Bush's decision to resolve the Korean crisis through negotiation breaks with the hawkish unilateralism that has characterized the administration. Whether by economic sanctions or otherwise, it is obvious that any strategy of dealing with North Korea will have to involve the cooperative support of our regional allies, South Korea first among them. Bush has thus discovered that the public sentiment of our allies is no flippant matter. Like it or not, the question confronts us: How do we stand?
Not so well. While South Korea and Japan still stand strong as our faithful allies in the Pacific, there is no question that recent U.S.-South Korean relations evidence decline. South Koreans still yearn to see the kin they were separated from over the 38th parallel during the Korean War; Bush's early and apparent disinterest in this caused deep disappointment.
Then in June, two American soldiers in South Korea accidentally crushed two Korean schoolgirls with a U.S. Army vehicle. When the soldiers were acquitted of negligent homicide, holding no one responsible, questions abounded about the U.S. military presence in Korea.
Now that tensions escalate between North Korea and the United States, South Koreans are reminded of these concerns. In a recent poll by the Chosun Ilbo, a major South Korean newspaper, 53 percent of those surveyed said they disliked the United States -- up nearly 40 percent since 1994. Reflecting this trend, on Dec. 19th, South Koreans elected President Roh Moo Hyun, who suggested Korean security policy does not necessarily have to follow American dictate.
And thus, here we are, attempting to dictate. Although much of this tide of sentiment expresses romantic and naïve ideas about North Korea, the fact still remains: This is a problem. It has to be dealt with. Diplomacy matters.
These three lessons, while simple, are key foreign policy concerns as the Bush administration stands at a crossroads before North Korea and Iraq. Make no mistake about it, Bush is now moving in the right direction through the confusing mire that is North Korea. But will memory serve the administration as it ponders questions in the future?
