Since British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain left Munich in October 1938 to become the 20th century's most maligned dupe, the word appeasement has been an anathema to international politicians.

One of President Bush's frequently cited justifications for the war/fossil fuel consumption program in the Persian Gulf is the need to avoid appeasing Saddam Hussein's aggression, to avoid repeating the mistake European leaders made in the late 1930s when they allowed Adolf Hitler's aggression to go unchecked.

That the 66 year-old president's perceptions of the war are based on a World War II paradigm is understandable, but his frequent invoking of the Munich precedent may derive from more than simple generational memory.

Bush's insistent attacks on appeasement may stem from guilt over his administration's inept diplomacy in the months before the war.

In the Jan. 22 issue of The Village Voice, Murray Waas documents the administration's private and public assurances to Iraq that the United States was neutral in any Iraq/Kuwait disputes, assurances that Saddam may have interpreted as a green light for his invasion.

As early as February 1990, Saddam had been indicating his displeasure with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and his belief that these countries' oil and financial policies constituted an act of war against Iraq. Had Bush unambiguously condemned Saddam's saber rattling or even ordered some manner of naval and air force activity -- that would have signaled U.S. intent to defend Kuwait -- Saddam might never have invaded his neighbor.

The world will never know whether decisive American diplomacy and military action before Aug. 2 could have prevented Hussein from invading Kuwait. What is known is that American diplomacy during the first six months of 1990, as documented by Waas, reveals an administration eager to accommodate Saddam. The low points of this diplomacy follow:

--On April 25, in testimony before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee, Secretary of State James Baker declined to criticize Saddam's threat that he would use chemical weapons to deter nuclear attack.

--On April 26, Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly, before a House foreign affairs subcommittee attended by an Iraqi embassy officer, excused Saddam's threats to Israel as mere rhetoric.

--On July 20, Pete Williams, spokesman for Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, repudiated the defense secretary's remarks of the previous day that the United States would defend Kuwait if it were attacked.

--On July 24, State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler stated, "We do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait, and there are no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait."(This and all quotes are from Waas' article in the Jan. 22 issue of The Village Voice.)

--On July 27, Congress passed modest economic sanctions against Iraq. The Bush administration, according to Waas, subsequently "mounted an aggressive and ultimately successful campaign to make sure the sanctions were defeated."

--On July 31, Kelly denied Kuwait three times before a House foreign affairs subcommittee. "Historically, the U.S. has taken no position on the border disputes in the area, not on matters pertaining to internal OPEC deliberations."

"We have no defense treaty relationship with any gulf country. That is clear . . . we have not historically taken a position on border disputes."

Representative Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.) asked Kelly, if it would be correct to say that, if Iraq invaded Kuwait, the United States would not be obligated to commit its military forces in Kuwait's defense.

Kelly replied, "That is correct."

These statements all sent a consistent and accommodating message to Saddam.

This brief chronology excludes the well-documented meeting between Saddam and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie on July 25 in which Glaspie compared Saddam's bellicose response to his economic plight with an America's Founding Father's belief in "freedom or death."

Glaspie also assured Saddam once again that the United States was neutral in all Iraq/Kuwait border disputes and that she had direct instructions from the president to seek better relations with Iraq.

The mainstream media reported the Glaspie incident in August, but has avoided asking Bush and Baker to explain U.S. diplomacy prior to Aug. 2, preferring instead to interview retired generals and to gush over high tech superweapons.

Despite bellicose threats from Saddam and U.S. intelligence reports indicating that Iraq was planning some aggression towards Kuwait, the Bush administration consistently signaled to Saddam that it would not go to war over Kuwait. The Bush policy prior to Aug. 2 comes dangerously close to appeasement.

So while hoping for a quick victory and wondering what our role in the war should be, those of us on the home front should investigate the reasons for the seeming ineptitude of U.S. diplomacy.